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Abstract. This paper describes and explains the variable extent to which domestic interest organizations 
seek access to the multiple venues provided by the EU system of governance. Our in-depth analysis of 
four member-states – France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany – reveals substantial variance in 
multilevel venue-shopping, differences that disconfirm some descriptive accounts reported in the 
Europeanization literature. Surprising is that French organizations develop extensive Europeanized 
network strategies whereas the political strategies of Dutch interest organizations are, compared to other 
countries, rather weakly Europeanized. Our multivariate analysis reveals that the nature of policy issues 
significantly explains the extensiveness of multilevel venue-shopping and that generic information on 
policy sector or the interest organization’s political capabilities has little explanatory power. These 
conclusions are due to a fine-grained measurement instrument that takes into consideration the actors 
involvement in specific policy issues as well as the fragmented nature of the demand-side of interest 
group politics.   2
Introduction 
In the early nineties Streeck and Schmitter (1991) formulated the hypothesis that a 
European transnational pluralist system of interest representation would gradually supplement 
existing systems of national corporatism. Partially in response to the Streeck and Schmitter 
thesis, much scholarship started to concentrate on finding a proper characterization of interest 
group politics at the level of the European Union (EU). Since the last ten years there has been 
a growing literature on how the development of the unique European interest group system 
feeds back into traditional modes of interest representation at the member-state level. This 
research on the adaptation of domestic modes of interest representation is strongly linked to a 
broader empirical literature on Europeanization, whereby the overarching research question 
concerns, simply put, how features of the EU system cause a response and the nature of this 
response within domestic political systems (Eising 2007a). In this area, most scholars 
categorize interest group research under heading ‘the Europeanization of politics’, namely 
how does the EU affect meso-level political organizations such as parties and interest groups. 
Are these actors able to exploit new political opportunities? Do they adapt their political 
strategies and/or frame their issues of concern differently when confronted with EU issues?  
However, the fragmented nature of most research efforts has resulted into a literature 
that remains ambiguous about how national systems of interest intermediation adapt to a 
political context where these national systems are increasingly embedded in a supranational 
system of governance. Underlying this puzzle is the notion that European integration has 
substantially affected systems of national interest representation, both in terms of the groups 
that matter for government, the groups that are able to pressurize government, and for the 
strategies group deploy when seeking political influence. The main purpose of this paper is to 
offer a more systematic and comparative empirical account of these issues. More concretely, 
we aim to get a better sense of how domestic groups select among the large supply of access 
points within the European multi-level political environment. We call this multilevel venue-
shopping and we presume that this shopping varies according to member-state, organization 
type or policy sector. Additionally, we identify and test some factors that explain the 
occurrence and extensiveness of multilevel venue-shopping. More in particular, we 
investigate the embeddedness of groups within the domestic political constellation, policy 
sector and policy specialization, some specific characteristic of the policy-issues groups are 
involved in and their exchange networks with key domestic institutions.  
The paper takes a bottom-up perspective, namely the domestic input into the 
supranational level and how various factors ‘push’ groups to transcend borders. We ignore   3
importance of implementation as well as the direct impact of the EU interest system – the 
pull-effect of the EU – on the national system. Our starting point is that national groups are 
confronted with a set of European and international policy issues, issues which challenge 
them to develop a political influence strategy. The nature of these strategies – more precisely 
the effort of groups to build lobby-networks at multiple layers of government – forms the 
empirical core of the paper.  
The paper will be structured as follows. The next section outlines the research problem by, 
first, sketching the effects of political de-bordering on national representational systems and 
the multilevel nature of interest group strategies, and second, reviewing existing empirical 
studies. The subsequent section presents our research design. This is followed by an empirical 
description of how groups in France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany seek access at 
multiple levels of government. The third section describes some explanatory factors and 
analyses their effect on our dependent variable which measures the extent to which domestic 
interest groups build diverse multilevel networks.  
 
Studying EU governance and its impact on domestic groups  
The notion of transnational pluralism, as introduced by Schmitter and Streeck, implies 
a denser, more diverse population of interest groups and, because resources are finite, more 
competition for scarce political resources and a decreasing potential for centralized policy 
coordination. Moreover, the fact that the boundaries of national political systems are blurring 
creates exit-options and the opportunity to realize political objectives by by-passing the 
central government (Hirschman 1970; Bartolini 2005). Such a ‘de-bordering’ also entails 
institutional fragmentation whereby different political levels offer specific opportunities for a 
large number of, often more specialized, interest organizations. In sum, exit-options and 
specialization mitigate the level of potential competition to be expected in a crowded 
population of interest organizations. As a result, national interest organizations operate in a 
complex multilayered political environment. In the past, the coincidence of boundaries led to 
the institutionalization of interest representation at the nation-state level and the development 
of distinct national modes of interest representation (e.g. consociationalism in the Benelux 
countries, statism in France, neo-corporatism in Scandinavian countries). De-bordering, 
however, leads to a pluralist EU-system with distinct traits (Eising 2008), including a plurality 
of modes according to which state-society relations can be organized (Falkner 2000). We still 
know very little, however, on how national interest groups and policy-makers cope with the 
complexities of the increasing multi-level political environment of the European Union.    4
During the past two decades interest group scholars started to analyze this puzzle 
empirically and part of this research has been concentrated on how domestic constellations 
affect the propensity of domestic groups to make use of EU-level political opportunity 
structure. A large literature discusses how these developments shape or transform the bias of 
political representation. To put it bluntly, does Europe disadvantage weaker interests and 
reproduce existing power constellations or does it empower weak interests and thereby 
transform power constellations? Yet, although most researchers agree that a substantial 
relation exists between the embeddedness of an interest groups within the domestic contexts 
and its inclination to address EU-level actors, the precise nature of this relationship remains 
unclear, partially due to seemingly contradictory research outcomes.  
Generally, two opposite conclusions predominate with regard to how domestic 
embeddedness relates to multilevel political strategies. On the one hand, there are those who 
argue that multi-level venue shopping requires substantial capabilities and that especially 
large players with abundant resources are able to develop such sophisticated strategies. Based 
on an analysis of data collected among German, British and French business associations, 
Eising concludes that European integration reinforces existing constellations and re-affirms 
the position of those players that are already strong (2007b). This is similar to what Beyers 
labeled as the so-called persistence hypothesis (2002) which states that extensive multilevel 
networks are related to strong domestic access; groups with strong (weak) domestic access are 
more (less) likely to be active at the EU-level, i.e. something that resembles what Wessels 
calls ‘national corporatism at the European level’ (1999). On the other hand, other researchers 
show that groups use the EU-level in order to bypass an unfavorable domestic constellation. 
For instance, Poloni-Staudinger analyses British, German and French data on the activities of 
environmental groups and concludes that ‘as the national opportunity structure begins to close, 
groups shift their activities to the European level’ (2008; see also Marks and McAdam 1996; 
Fairbass and Jordan 2001). In contrast, when the opportunity structure opened – because 
parties with a greener platform became part of government – groups were less likely to shift 
to Europe.  
Another point of disagreement concerns the explanation of the relationship between 
domestic variables and EU-level activities. Basically one can distinguish four types of 
explanation.  
First, there is the argument that domestic interest groups are socialized by national 
modes of interest representation. The rules, norms and habits adopted in different national 
contexts may fit well with the modes of policy-making at the European level. Well-known in   5
this regard is Schmidt’s claim that the EU can be best characterized as a semi-pluralist system 
that opens up for domestic group access and influence. However, in contrast to traditional 
pluralistic systems the EU is heavily characterized by consensual non-majoritarian modes of 
policy-making, which makes it similar to a neo-corporatist system of policymaking. In 
Schmidt’s comparison of Germany, France, the UK and Italy it is argued that the EU’s multi-
level environment makes German actors more at ease in Brussels ‘because they have been 
much more multi-level players than either the French of the British’ (2006, 142-3; see also 
Schmidt 1996; Coen 1998, 97-8; Eising 2007b, 335). The negotiation skills German groups 
acquire domestically are a valuable asset in an EU context. In contrast, for French groups the 
political environment of the EU is a rather unfamiliar one; the French statists context is less 
featured by horizontal negotiations between public and private actors. Although the EU would 
provide French groups with new opportunities, the clash of the French style of – more closed 
and often confrontational – interest intermediation makes that French groups are not well-
adapted and latecomers in the European lobby-process (2006, 123). Consequently, EU-level 
activities among French groups remain limited compared to groups originating from neo-
corporatist countries such as Germany, Austria, the Netherlands or Belgium. This expectation 
conflicts with the notion of a compensation hypothesis whereby actors with weak domestic 
access, mainly situated in statist countries, are eager to seek compensation at the EU-level. 
Yet, the comparative knowledge about this argument is mixed. While some scholars found 
evidence in support of this argument (Eising 2007b; Coen 1998; Schmidt 2006), others 
researchers observed that groups in statists countries (such as France, Spain, Italy) were more 
likely to target EU institutions compared to neo-corporatist countries such as the Netherlands 
and Germany (della Porta and Caiani 2007).  
Second, most researchers have looked, in various ways, to organizational resources 
and capabilities. The obvious hypothesis in this regard is that the larger the organizational 
capabilities, the more interest groups will turn to the EU. This hypothesis is equivalent with 
the more general notion that the EU empowers the already powerful and tends to reproduce 
and existing power constellations. The basic idea hereby is that a complex multi-level 
environment requires many resources in order to be effective. This hypothesis finds support in 
Eising’s research (2004; 2007b), but not all researchers have tested this hypotheses 
systematically. One of the problems with this variable is its multidimensional nature whereby 
different proxies for resources may generate different research outcomes. Also the various 
ways in which this variable has been made operational makes a comparison of research 
outcomes difficult. For instance, in Eising’s research the economic weight of business firms   6
has a positive impact, but this variable is tested in little other research (2007b). Moreover, the 
resources of some groups, such as NGOs, cannot be easily measured in terms of economic 
weight.  
A third set of variables concerns not resources as such, but focuses on resource 
dependencies (not mere resources). Also this is a concept that can be conceived in various 
ways. One way is to look at the organization’s goals and to analyze to what extent an 
organization depends on EU institutions in order to realize its political goals. Much research 
shows that the relevance of EU institutions coincides with the policy sector within which a 
group’s goals are situated and, therefore, strategies are likely to depend considerably on this 
factor (Bennett 1999; Kriesi et al. 2006, 350; Beyers and Kerremans 2007b; Eising 2008). 
Some groups are active in policy domains where EU competencies are weak or non-existent 
and where policy benefits are still realized at the national level. Such groups are less 
pressured to Europeanize their strategies, while groups active in strongly Europeanized 
sectors will adapt more. Another way to look at resource dependencies focuses on resources 
that are crucial in terms of organizational survival. Here we can think about dependence on 
government subsidies, membership dues or the competitive nature of the immediate 
environment in which groups need to survive. In a recent paper Beyers and Kerremans 
demonstrate when much energy is spent on managing these sorts of dependencies, less is 
invested in EU-related policies (2007b). One limitation with this recent analysis, however, is 
that the dependent variable concerns investment in EU-related policies and not whether these 
investments are situated at the EU-level and entail political strategies that target EU-
institutions.  
A fourth set of explanations concerns how groups are politically positioned within 
their domestic political environment. More concretely we can consider the extent to which 
groups are close to or far away from a dominant status quo and the political actors 
representing this status quo. One of the main ideas of multilevel venue-shopping is that once 
groups are blocked at one policy level, they turn to another level in order to find attention and 
support for their objectives. This argument resembles what Beyers labeled as the 
compensation hypothesis, whereby the EU-level is used as a venue that compensates for 
domestic weakness (2002). The mechanism is more general than EU-studies and covers a 
broad literature on federalism (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 216-34), protest and contentious 
politics (Sewell 2001, 51-88) and transnational advocacy (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Those 
scholars who focused on the preference positioning of interest groups in the EU often arrive at 
the conclusion that fits into a compensation effect (Fairbass and Jordan 2001; Poloni-  7
Staudinger 2008).  
Interestingly, research that concentrates on compensation focuses on the strategic 
notion of damage-limitation as a consequence of failed or limited domestic access, while the 
persistence-argument relies more on the explanatory power of organizational skills and 
experiences gained through repeated interactions at the domestic level. The question, however, 
is to what extent these are mutually exclusive mechanisms or not. Unfortunately, little 
research has been conducted in order to test and compare these hypotheses systematically.  
In addition to ambiguity regarding the dependent and explanatory variables, research 
on this matter is also plagued by methodological and conceptual fragmentation. To begin with, 
some of the existing ambiguities are due to the fact that scholars use different conceptual 
categorizations. For instance, because Schmidt classifies the UK as a statist system and Green 
Cowles puts the UK in the pluralistic camp, both develop contradictory expectations which 
they see confirmed in their data (Eising 2007a, 178-9; Schmidt 2006; Green-Cowles 2001). 
Another problem with current empirical research is that scholars rely on very different data-
sets. For instance, Rainer Eising’s analysis is based on business organizations in the UK, 
Germany and France and confirms the persistence hypothesis. In contrast, scholars who 
observe a compensation effect – e.g. Fairbas and Jordan 2001, Poloni-Staudinger 2008 – 
relied mainly on environment NGOs. Generally, there are very few examples where a diverse 
sample of groups – including different sorts of NGOs, business and labor organizations – is 
analyzed. Finally, in measuring lobby contacts – at both the EU and the domestic level – 
researchers tend to rely on rather crude measures of different institutions and levels of 
government (Polini-Staudinger 2008, 539-40). Sometimes a simple distinction is made 
between ‘an EU institution’ and ‘the domestic level’ whereby the former category doesn’t 
differentiate to what extent actors with the same nationality play the role as key inter-
mediators between the domestic and the EU-level. For example, it is plausible to assume that 
with regard to the European Parliament national MEPs are easier to access compared to MEPs 
of other countries. Or, the Council is accessed through the national permanent representative 
(PR) in Brussels rather than through foreign PRs. Our research design attempts to redress 
these shortcomings by offering a more fine-grained measurement of lobby-networks and by 
covering a large variety of interest groups – business, labor and NGOs – in four member-
states.  
 
Research design 
Our dataset is part of a larger research project on how interest groups interact with   8
elected and non-elected officials in four member states – Belgium, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands
1 – as well at the EU-level. The focus of this project is on the efforts interest 
groups make to influence the EU’s external trade policies in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), more particularly in the areas of agriculture, steel/metal and services. One part of this 
larger project tries to find out whether and if so, how national interest groups have 
Europeanized their political strategies. Data collection has been based on an elite-survey 
conducted between May 2003 and February 2006. In this section, we briefly outline the 
research design by indicating how the fieldwork was conducted and how interest groups were 
sampled. 
One of the problems with elite-surveying concerns the identification of a relevant 
sample of interest groups. As part of the research questions can only be dealt with in a 
comparative design, cross-sectional samples that are structurally equivalent and comparable 
across countries are needed. For each country and the EU-level we aimed at a final sample of 
120 completed interviews; 20 with public officials and 100 with interest groups.
2 In addition 
to this we tried to get a diverse sample with a large variety of interest groups including NGOs, 
public interests, business interests and labor interests.  
Basically, our sample is constructed on the basis of a positional sampling technique 
for which we screened a large amount of formal sources.
3 From all these sources only interest 
                                                 
1 These countries represent advanced export-oriented economies with a long and – as founding members of the 
EU – a shared and similar tradition of multi-lateral co-operation. They differ, however, on some key variables. 
There is of course the difference between small and large or medium-sized countries. A more important variation 
though, concerns the varying policy positions of these countries on trade liberalization, ranging on a continuum 
from a great reserve (France) to a small reserve (the Netherlands). France, for instance, traditionally shows some 
reluctance and skepticism with regard to further trade liberalization while the Netherlands has traditionally been 
more in favor. Germany and Belgium are located somewhere in between these two countries, with Belgium 
being more reluctant towards trade liberalization than the Netherlands, and Germany being more positive on 
trade liberalization than France. This variation is not only reflected in official government policies of these 
countries, it is also visible in their respective public opinions on trade (see Beyers and Kerremans 2007a). A 
comparison between the interest groups system and how this interacts with party and government officials may 
thus yield interesting results. 
2 Our research project also includes public officials and how they interact with interest groups, but because 
public officials are only indirectly relevant for the problem we deal with in this paper (the measurement of 
gaining access to public officials, see below), we do not pay extensive attention the interviews conducted with 
them.  
3 Because the larger project deals with trade policymaking, we especially focus on sources which list interest 
groups that are potentially active in this sector. The WTO-website (www.wto.org) contains a number of useful 
sources ranging from listings of interest groups and civil society organizations attending ministerial conferences, 
expert meetings, position papers delivered to the WTO and so on. These sources included:  
-  Joint UNCTAD WTO Symposium (September 1997), to prepare for the High Level Meeting on Least-
Developed Countries, 
-  Symposium on Trade, Environment and Sustainable Development (1998), 
-  Ministerial Conference Geneva (1998), 
-  Third Ministerial Conference Seattle (30/11-3/12 1999), 
-  Work session on services (06/07/01), 
-  Work session on Trips-access to essential medicines (06/07/01),   9
groups were retained; think tanks, institutes, policy centers, media actors and individual firms 
were not considered. There is of course overlap among the different sources. Each interest 
group has been coded once as soon as the group was mentioned in one of the sources. All 
these interest groups were coded on the basis of a number of variables such as type of 
interests (employers, trade unions, NGOs), policy sector in which the group is active and so 
on. For this, a coding frame was established beforehand and coding occurred through an 
interactive process among the researchers that included an extensive consultation of external 
sources (such as monographs, websites and experts). The established list, however, does not 
correspond with a balanced cross-sectional sample that is structurally equivalent across 
countries. Two major problems had to be solved.  
First, the list was too large as it contains several highly specialized business interest 
groups that had no link at all to the policy-sectors on which the project focused (external trade 
policies with regard to agriculture, steel/metal and services). Regarding sectoral business and 
labor interests we only retained those sectoral associations that have a direct (agriculture/food 
industry, metal/steel, services) or an indirect link (transport and retailing/distribution) with the 
policy sectors under investigation. NGOs were retained in the sample as well as cross-sectoral 
specific interest groups such as cross-sectoral employer unions, trade unions and associations 
representing small and medium enterprises (SME’s).  
Second, there was a risk that our sources would generate a biased sample with regard 
to access and mobilization; less visible and less active organizations run the risk to be 
excluded.
4 This risk was particularly high for trade unions. Although trade unions play an 
active part in domestic politics (especially in neo-corporatist countries such as Belgium, 
Germany, or the Netherlands), they were barely named in the sources mentioned above 
(Beyers and Kerremans 2007). In order to redress this potential bias, we proceeded as follows. 
First, for all international and European umbrella organizations mentioned in one of the above 
sources, we checked whether or not their European or domestic members were already 
                                                                                                                                                         
-  Work session on food safety and the SPS agreement (07/07/01), 
-  NGO’s attending the Ministerial Conference in Doha (2001), 
-  Public Symposium Doha Development Agenda and Beyond (29/04/02 – 01/05/02), 
-  All position papers for the period 27/10/1998 – 13/11/2002. 
From all this we selected the lists of attendance for the Euro-level, Belgian, French, German and Dutch actors. 
Second, DG Trade of the European Commission has established a Civil Society Dialogue, an open process of 
consultation to which interest groups may subscribe (http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/civil_soc/intro1.php). Also from 
this source we retained Euro-level, Belgian, French, German and Dutch actors. Third, we coded all interest 
groups mentioned in a policy event data set that was developed for the purpose of this project. Fourthly, we 
added Euro-level, Belgian, French, German and Dutch actors that are listed in the WTO-history project, 
University of Washington (http://depts.washington.edu/wtohist).  
4 However, it should be noted that some of our sources, such as the EU’s Civil Society Dialogue, have a very 
low access barrier as it mainly functions as a registration database.   10
included. If not, they were added. Second, for the three policy sectors, we investigated the 
potential cleavages so that our sample would include varying and/or opposing policy positions. 
In order to identify the actors connected to these cleavages we used the relational data-set 
compiled by Bernhard Wessels (Wissenschaftzentrum Berlin) which links Euro-level 
associations to their domestic members (Wessels 2004). Finally, we consulted a number of 
experts (especially with respect to trade unions) and checked the composition of key advisory 
bodies at the domestic and the EU-level (such as the EU’s Economic and Social Committee) 
in order to fine-tune the sample with regard to trade unions.  
Table 1 gives an overview of the results of the fieldwork regarding the interviews with 
interest group officials in the four countries.
5 In the table we make a rough distinction 
between a) NGOs or public interest groups, b) economic/business and employers and c) trade 
unions. The first group consists of environmental NGOs, consumer NGOs, development 
NGOs and a small number of women’s organizations or organizations representing protest 
movements. The second group contains cross-sectoral business associations, sectoral business 
associations (especially in the field of agriculture, services and metal/steel) as well as small 
‘businesses’ such as farmers, professions and small and medium enterprises. Under the 
category of trade unions we find both cross-sectoral and sectoral employers’ associations. 
Although this categorization in three classes conceals much heterogeneity, our analyses show 
that much variation in the sample corresponds to this rough distinction.  
There is another aspect of the table which needs to be clarified, namely the fact that 
the sample size differs considerably from country to country. Especially the bigger sample of 
Belgium and France compared to the smaller sample for Germany is noteworthy. Our 
sampling was aimed at a structurally equivalent and comparable sample across countries; this 
does not necessarily mean samples of an equal size. As such, specific institutional and 
political conditions within the four countries resulted in different sample sizes. Two factors 
explain the size of the Belgian sample. First, there is the specific nature of the Belgian 
federation which results in a fairly fragmented interest group system. For instance, whereas in 
most other countries we find one environmental peak association, Belgium has four 
environmental peak associations, one for each of the sub-states (Bursens 1997). In addition to 
this, interest representation by labor unions is quite fragmented with different sectoral and 
cross-sectoral unions linked to the socialist, liberal and catholic pillars. The fragmentation of 
                                                 
5 In addition also 146 representatives of government institutions, parliamentarians and political parties were 
interviewed, but these interviews are not analyzed in this paper. The same project also includes 139 EU-level 
interest groups and public officials.   11
the trade union system is even more pronounced for France and explains the larger sample 
compared to Germany and, to some extent, the Netherlands. In Germany the existence of one 
big cross-sectoral trade union and its cross-sectoral satellites led to an identification of 15 
trade unions of which 13 were sampled. A similar procedure in France led to the identification 
of 65 trade unions of which only 36 could be sampled.  
 
Table 1. Overview of the sample and fieldwork results (Belgium, Netherlands, Germany 
and France) 
 Belgium  Netherlands  Germany  France  Total 
NGOs/public interests 
- sample 
- n response (%) 
 
53 
44 (83%) 
 
37 
34 (92%) 
 
36 
28 (78%) 
 
38 
34 (89%) 
 
164 
140 (85%) 
Economic/business/employers 
- sample 
- n response (%) 
 
87 
80 (92%) 
 
65 
57 (88%) 
 
73 
52 (71%) 
 
78 
62 (79%) 
 
303 
251 (83%) 
Trade unions 
- sample 
- n response (%) 
 
29 
24 (83%) 
 
18 
16 (89%) 
 
13 
10 (77%) 
 
36 
32 (89%) 
 
96 
82 (85%) 
Total 
- sample 
- n response (%) 
 
169 
148  
(88%) 
 
120 
107 
(89%) 
 
122 
90  
(74%) 
 
152 
128  
(84%) 
 
563 
473  
(84%) 
 
Interviews were conducted on the basis of a standardized questionnaire with almost all 
questions being closed. Key parts of the questionnaire dealt with different characteristics of 
the political system within which the actors operate, the policy positions of actors with respect 
to twenty policy issues, their political strategies (including both traditional forms of lobbying 
as well as outside lobbying) in relation to these issues, the resources actors had at their 
disposal and invested in political activities, and their embeddedness in domestic and/or 
European policy networks (by social network analysis). In this paper only a subset of the 
variables will be used, namely those variables that concern the efforts to seek access to other 
public and private actors at multiple levels of government. It is important to add that the data 
do not concern measurements at the level of each individual actors, but at the level of specific 
trade policy issues in which actors were involved. When interest groups officials were 
involved in three, two or one issues, they were asked for information on these three, two or 
one issues respectively. This makes that the size of the analysed data does not equal the 
number of respondents, but the number of actor-issue interactions.  
 
Multilevel network strategies beyond the national level 
In this section, we compare and analyze the different network strategies – the seeking 
of access – actors deployed on the occasion of different issues in which they were involved. 
The section is organized as follows. First, we discuss the extent to which different types of   12
interest organizations in different countries sought contact to different EU-level and 
international level institutions. As the issues our respondents were involved in concern WTO-
related trade policies, it is relevant to consider some non-EU related international venues as 
well. Second, we analyze to what extent there exists a systematic and cumulative pattern in 
this data so that it is meaningful to summarize all different venues into one scale which 
measures the overall extensiveness of the multilevel network strategies.  
It is important to note how we conceptualized network strategies, inside lobbying or 
seeking of access. All network questions during the interview were introduced with a short 
description so that respondents were presented a similar understanding of what we meant with 
‘seeking access to’. The statement was worded as follows:  
In order to prepare policy positions and to affect policies interest groups, politicians 
and public officials often seek access to other actors. In such contacts, exchange of 
information is vital. We define ‘information’ fairly broadly. It may include advice on 
the best political strategy to be used, knowledge about others’ strategy, as well as a 
range of sometimes confidential technical and scientific expertise. With the subsequent 
questions we investigate these contacts with respect to the event you selected 
 
The next three tables present bivariate results for different types of access points, 
namely transnational interest group (table 2), European institutions (table 3) and venues at the 
level of the WTO (table 4). For each table we separated the sample into, first, organization 
types, and, second, nationality. The tables also include Chi
2-tests which help us to focus on 
the most significant and substantial differences.  
Table 2 shows the extent to which domestic interest organizations sought access to 
different transnational organizations. In order to put the magnitude of transnational contacts in 
a comparative perspective we put in the first row a dummy-variable which represents the 
extent to which domestic interest organizations addressed other domestic organizations. It is 
clear that generally domestic networks prevail over transnational networks. In addition to the 
opportunity to work with EU-level interest groups, domestic groups may seek collaboration 
with domestic groups in other member-states (for instance German groups having networks 
with French groups), international interest groups (such as the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions), domestic interests groups in countries outside Europe (for instance in the 
US, Canada or elsewhere) or domestic interest groups within European countries that are not 
part of the EU (such as Norway, Iceland, Turkey).  
   13
Table 2. Interest group type (percentages, N=567) 
  Organization type  Country of origin 
 Overall (percentages)  NGOs  Business  Labor  Chi
2 
df=2 
Belgian Dutch German French  Chi
2 
df=3 
1. domestic interest 
groups (84%) 
86 84 80  Ns  80 82 96 88  ns 
1. Euro-level interest 
groups (68%) 
59 75 70  23.04 
p=.0015 
58 69 68 79  15.88 
p=.0012 
2. National groups in 
other member states 
(52%) 
50 52 53  Ns  56 36 51 61  19.80 
p=.0002 
3. International interest 
groups (47%) 
53 42 47  Ns  52 48 43 46  Ns 
4. National groups 
outside Europe (41%) 
54 39 21  31.99 
p<.0001 
45 37 42 37  Ns 
5. National groups in 
European countries not 
part of the EU (21%) 
24 21 16  Ns  24 14 21 24  Ns 
 
When we compare all these possibilities, we find some substantial differences between 
various access-points, different countries and types of interest groups. To begin with, all other 
non-EU related multi-level and transnational networks are, although not negligible, 
substantially less important compared to networks with EU-level associations. It appears that 
French, German, Dutch and Belgian groups are strongly encaged in a European-national 
framework whereby EU-level interest groups function as a crucial intermediating channel to 
the European level (68% contact Euro-level interest groups). Yet, groups in these four 
countries develop substantial transnational networks with other EU member-state level groups 
(52% of the cases), but it is not always clear to what extent these contacts take place 
independently from the EU-level contacts. Unfortunately, we didn’t systematically measure 
this. It is plausible to imagine that these European transnational networks result from 
interactions taking place within EU peak associations and that this variable is strongly 
correlated with networks developed with EU-level associations.
6  
Some of the groups develop considerable transnational networks, at least more than 
others. For instance, NGOs seek more contact with other national groups outside Europe and 
they develop somewhat more contacts with international groups (although not significant). 
While NGOs have rather strong transnational networks, their networks with EU-level groups 
are compared to labor and business significantly less dense. The transnational orientation of 
NGOs can be explained by the fact that several of these groups are involved in development 
cooperation projects in developing countries, something which ties them to clients outside 
                                                 
6 Indeed, the variable ‘exchange with EU-level interest groups’ is significantly related to ‘national groups in 
other member states’ (Cramer’s V=.33, Chi
2=62.2274, df=1, p<.0001). A similar argument can be made with 
regard to national interest groups of European states that do not belong to the EU (such as Norway or Turkey). 
Quite some EU level interest groups (for instance Business Europe) have non-member-state interest groups 
among their membership.   14
Europe. Finally, when we look to the labor unions, it appears that they, compared to business 
and especially NGOs, have the most institutionalized EU-centered networks; they stick most 
to the domestic level (see Beyers and Kerremans 2007b), they work primarily through EU 
peak associations and their transnational networks remain confined to other EU-countries.  
In addition, when making a distinction according to nationality we observe some 
interesting differences. Dutch groups develop 20% less contacts with interest groups situated 
in other EU member-states and also for other transnational contacts, the Dutch have on 
average a lower percentage than the other countries. A significant difference concerns 
contacts with EU-level interest groups where we see that Belgian groups are, despite their 
proximity to Brussels, significantly less interested in Euro-level interest groups. It is not 
completely clear why this is the case, but possibly the complex multilayered nature of the 
Belgian polity makes that a large number of groups specialize in policies that are situated at 
the regional levels.
7 Also remarkable is the higher number of French groups that actively 
seeks access to Euro-level interest groups, a finding that apparently contradicts an image of 
French groups as being less Europeanized (see above).  
 
Table 3. Seeking access to European institutions (percentages, N=567) 
  Organization type  Country of origin 
   NGOs  Business  Labor  Chi
2 
df=2 
Belgian Dutch German French  Chi
2 
df=3 
1. national MEP 
(62%) 
57 66 60  Ns  57 60 60 69  Ns 
2. Commission DGs 
(52%) 
49 61 32  26.90 
p<.0001 
48 41 59 57  11.04 
p=.0115 
3. National PR 
(31%) 
12 47 26  67.07 
p<.0001 
30 27 20 36  Ns 
4. Commission 
cabinets (28%) 
15 38 25  30.61 
p<.0001 
25 17 28 39  16.89 
p=.0007 
5. Other MEP 
(26%) 
28 25 21  Ns  24 17 32 29  9.33 
p=.0253 
6. Member art. 133 
(19%) 
12 25 17  14.10 
p=.0009 
20 21 22 14  ns 
7. EP other 
committees. (15%) 
9 23 7  24.04 
P<.0001 
8  7  21 26  29.341 
p<.0001 
8. EP Rapporteur 
Trade (7%) 
5 11 5  7.37 
p=.0251 
9 6 4 10  Ns 
9. Secretariat 
Council (7%) 
3 10 6  8.58 
p=.0137 
2 8 4 12  11.84 
p=.0079 
10. Other PR (5%)  2  7  7  7.4578 
p=.0396 
6 2 7 6  Ns 
 
Table 3 analyses the seeking of access to European institutions. Let’s first look to the 
overall ranking in the first column. Most contacted are national Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) and Commission DGs. The results for the EP are interesting because the 
                                                 
7 Policy level specialization will be more outspoken in a dual federation compared to a cooperative federation – 
Germany – or a unitary state – France and the Netherlands.   15
policy issues to which the responses refer concern issues to be situated in the external trade 
policy domain, an area in which the EP has few formal competencies. That means that groups 
seek contact to institutions that are not necessarily the most influential (at least formally or 
procedurally) or that they build their network for some other reasons than immediate 
influence. The venues specialized in trade issues – such as committee 133 or the EP 
committee rapporteur on trade – gain on average less attention than for instance national 
MEPs or other committees in the European parliament. Probably it is important for interest 
organizations that MEPs are more pivotal than EC- or Council bureaucrats in generating a 
public debate on some salient issues; especially groups aiming to increase the scope of 
political attention will address the EP. In later analyses we’ll come back to this issue.  
Table 3 shows some relevant differences with regard to the type of interest group and 
the country where a domestic interest group comes from. To begin with, business interests are 
much more inclined to network with EC DGs, with the national Permanent Representation 
(PR), with Commission cabinets, with members of Committee 133, with rapporteurs in the EP 
and with the secretariat of the Council. The percentages are always higher than those of the 
NGOs and labor unions. This picture confirms some earlier analyses (see Beyers and 
Kerremans 2007b; Eising 2008); business is much more Europeanized and these results 
demonstrate that this general orientation translates into more extensive multilevel strategies. 
Moreover, it appears that the lobby-efforts of business interests are much more targeted at the 
institutions that enjoy formal and procedural influence (such as the EC DGs, Committee 133 
and the national PRs) in this policy area. Second, when looking at the country of origin it 
appears that the four countries do not differ much when it concerns seeking access via 
national intermediaries such national MEPs or the National PR; much access to Europe is 
sought through these two venues and national intermediaries in the Council or the EP play an 
equally important role in all four countries. Less prevalent are contacts whereby the origin of 
the interest organization and the origin of the addressee are not similar (such as contacts with 
‘other MEPs’ or ‘other PRs’).  
There are quite some differences regarding institutions such as the Commission and 
the EP. Dutch groups show the lowest propensity to lobby with the Commission DGs or the 
Cabinets; overall the Dutch results are below the level of activity found in the other three 
countries. The German and the French organizations are most active when it comes to 
contacting the Commission DGs and cabinets. Although Dutch groups target the EU via their 
national MEPs, they are, compared to the Belgians and in particular the Germans and the 
French, less often inclined to rely on non-Dutch MEPs. This image confirms some of our   16
earlier research findings of Dutch interest organizations as being less Europeanized (Beyers 
and Kerremans 2007b) and it fits into the results of table 2 which shows that Dutch 
organizations are, compared to other countries, on average less inclined to Europeanize their 
policy networks.  
As our project concentrates on WTO trade policies, the interview protocol included 
some venues that specialize in trade. It is not that we expect organizations to concentrate all 
their efforts on the WTO-venues in Geneva; basically the WTO is an intergovernmental 
organization. Therefore, it is crucial to convince member-state representatives and/or the EU-
delegation. Yet, given the importance of the WTO as a forum for negotiations in this domain, 
we can imagine that interest organizations try to convince various players who are active in 
this field. The results confirm indeed that WTO-level agents are far less important than 
domestic institutions or EU level agents (compare table 4 with table 2 and 3). Basically, the 
WTO-venue is accessed via the national PRs in Geneva (26% of the contacts); much less 
through the EU PR or indirectly through the PRs of other WTO partners (such as the US, 
Canada or Japan). Nonetheless, it is interesting to see how various organizations target this 
venue. To begin with, labor unions (again) make much less use of WTO-level opportunities 
compared to NGOs and, especially, business. This confirms earlier analyses whereby we 
traced the development of the WTO interest group system over time and where we observed 
labor unions are lagging behind when it comes to WTO-level mobilization (Beyers and 
Kerremans, 2007a). Second, when we compare the country of origin we see that organizations 
of bigger states, primarily France (again), are much more actively seeking access to the WTO. 
Also this confirms some earlier analyses of the involvement of French organizations in the 
WTO ministerial conferences and corresponds to an earlier finding of French groups being 
more active in the European multilevel system.  
 
Table 4. Seeking access to WTO venues in Geneva (percentages, N=567) 
  Organization type  Country of origin 
   NGOs  Business  Labor  Chi
2 
df=2 
Belgian Dutch German  French  Chi
2 
df=3 
1. national PR in 
Geneva (26%) 
21 33  19  10.95 
p=.0042 
20 20 28 37  15.43 
p=.0015 
2. WTO 
secretariat (19%) 
22 23  6  15.86 
p=.0004 
4 8 8 5  Ns 
3. EU PR in 
Geneva (11%) 
11 15  5  7.73 
p=.0210 
8 8 8  21  18.92 
p=.0003 
4. non-EU PR in 
Geneva (6%) 
8 8  0  8.90 
p=.0117 
10 21 20 27  14.10 
p=.0028 
 
These analyses provide an insight for each separate access-point. We observed that   17
some venues were more easily addressed than others, but we didn’t test to what extent the 
ranking or the importance of access points is something structural or a pattern that is 
equivalent for each of the countries. We know that Dutch organizations make less use of 
multiple access points; that French groups are pretty active; that national intermediaries are 
important interlocutors; and that labor unions generate, compared to other categories less 
transnational activities. The question is whether these conclusions can be reproduced and 
conceived as a more of less stable behavioral pattern which summarizes the seeking of access 
to different venues into a one-dimensional scale that measures the extensiveness of the multi-
level political strategies. It is plausible to assume that on average interest organizations tend to 
use some (more ‘easier’) network strategies more readily than other (more ‘difficult’) 
networks whereby the targeting of distant venues (such as the WTO secretariat in Geneva) is 
depends on the condition that venues closer to home are already targeted (for instance 
national MEPs). The opposite, however, the seeking of access to a venue close home, will not 
necessarily lead to strategies which seek to address distant venues. Such a cumulative pattern 
resembles the features of a Guttman-scale, a scaling technique quite regularly used for testing 
learning abilities, whereby test results for difficult items (e.g. calculus) are a conditional on 
success with easier test items (e.g. simple geometry), and not the other way around.  
We used the Mokken Scale Analysis or Polytomous Items (MSP) software in order to 
test whether the data on the different venues approximate the requirement of a Guttman-scale. 
An advantage of this procedure is that it combines an overall test with separate tests for the 
four sub-samples. Because the scaling-procedure results in the most optimal ranking of the 
access-points in terms of the cumulative properties, we can use the results in order to cross-
validate and check whether the scale has similar properties in each of the four countries. If 
this is the case, we are confident that a summed scale score has an equivalent meaning in all 
countries. Table 5 shows all venues with their rank in the Guttman-scale and the Loevinger’s 
coefficient of homogeneity, which as a rule of thumb needs to be above .30 in order to have a 
homogeneous scale. Occasionally we have some small deviations; in 8% the Loevinger’s H-
coefficient for item scalability is lower than .30, but in most of these cases H lies around .25 
or higher. The overall scale coefficients for all the data (N=567) as well as the separate 
country analyses lies well above .30. Therefore, we can conclude that these 19 items 
approximate quite well a cumulative structure. When looking at the rank (the higher the score 
the more frequent the venue is addressed), we can see a distinction in terms of distance 
whereby access-points located further away (Geneva, other member-states PR…) are least 
likely to be contacted. The Spearman rank-order correlations between the 19 venues in the   18
overall scale and the separate scales constructed for each different country of origin ranges 
between .86 and .97, which means that we can confidently conclude that a combination of 
these venues has a similar meaning for all four member-states. This allows us to combine the 
19 access-points into one overarching scale in which each unit change refers to one extra and 
more distant venue addressed by a domestic interest group. Or, a high score on this scale 
indicates more extensive efforts to expand international networks, while a low score implies 
that actors stick more to venues situated mostly at the national level.  
 
Table 5. The ranking of access-points, Guttman-scaling (rank and Loevinger’s H) 
 All  data, 
N=567 
H=.41 
Belgian, 
n=157 
H=.36 
Dutch, 
n=157 
H=.42 
German, 
n=134 
H=.35 
French, 
n=145 
H=.47 
PR in Brussels (other member-states)  1 
.46 
3 
.38 
1 
.81 
3 
.24 
2 
.69 
Non-European PR Geneva  2 
.39 
2 
.33 
6 
.46 
.08 5 
.31 
2 
.44 
The Council Secretariat  4 
.43 
1 
.43 
6 
.39 
.04 2 
.24 
4 
.53 
Trade Committee in the EP  4 
.40 
6 
.33 
2 
.46 
2 
.32 
3 
.47 
PR of the EU in Geneva  5 
.48 
5 
.48 
6 
.48 
5 
.31 
6 
.52 
Other committees in the EP  6 
.41 
5 
.39 
3 
.31 
8 
.32 
8 
.49 
The Council Committee 113  8 
.31 
9 
.28 
12 
.31 
9 
.27 
5 
.46 
Secretariat of the WTO  8 
.43 
7 
.28 
12 
.41 
6 
.42 
9 
.51 
Groups in non-EU European states  9 
.35 
10 
.29 
7 
.32 
8 
.34 
7 
.44 
MEPs (other member-states)  11 
.41 
11 
.45 
9 
.42 
13 
.37 
10 
.40 
The national PR in Geneva  11 
.42 
9 
.32 
10 
.49 
10 
.38 
13 
.45 
Commission Cabinets  12 
.40 
12 
.38 
9 
.35 
11 
.32 
14 
.48 
The national PR in Brussels  13 
.35 
13 
.34 
13 
.27 
12 
.31 
11 
.42 
Groups outside Europe (e.g. Canada or 
the US) 
14 
.37 
14 
.28 
15 
.48 
15 
.30 
12 
.44 
International interest groups  15 
.37 
16 
.43 
17 
.46 
15 
.26 
15 
.37 
Interest groups other member states  17 
.42 
17 
.33 
14 
.43 
16 
.42 
17 
.48 
Commission DGs  17 
.46 
15 
.45 
16 
.49 
17 
.47 
16 
.42 
National MEPs  18 
.53 
18 
.51 
18 
.57 
18 
.42 
18 
.60 
Euro-level interest groups  19 
.44 
19 
.33 
19 
.41 
19 
.54 
19 
.47 
Index: the higher the rank, the more frequent the access-point is used.  
 
 
We summarize this section’s main findings by presenting an analysis with 
organization type, country of origin as independent variable and multilevel network-strategies 
as dependent variable. In table 6 we compare the average scores, based on an index consisting   19
of the sum of all venues, an index that ranges between 0 and 19.
8 In general, this overview 
confirms what the more detailed analyses already demonstrated, namely that French groups 
seek most access to venues situated at the European and international level. The French are 
followed by the Germans and the Belgians. The Dutch are least likely to expand their network 
to various European and international access points. These differences between the four 
countries of origin are statistically significant (F=4.60, p=.0034, df=3). Yet, not all differences 
are due to the country of origin and as table 7 suggests we have substantial differences 
between different types of interest organizations (F=9.93, p<.0001, df=2). In general, business 
organizations develop the most extensive networks, followed by the NGOs and the labor 
unions. Nonetheless, within the countries there are large differences between these three 
categories. Especially the French business organizations are very active, while in Germany 
the labor unions are more active than the other German interest group types and German labor 
unions are also much more internationally oriented than the labor unions in the other three 
countries.   
 
Table 6 Average multi-levelness of seeking access (averages and standard deviations) 
 Belgian 
(n=157) 
Dutch 
(n=131) 
German 
(n=134) 
French 
(n=145) 
Overall 
NGOs  (n=197)  4.73 4.96 4.67 5.45  4.93  (3.85) 
Business  (n=264)  6.10 4.93 5.77 8.13  6.20  (4.38) 
Labor  (n=106)  3.78 3.00 6.70 4.41  4.42  (3.04) 
Overall 5.08 
(3.70) 
4.69 
(3.89) 
5.56 
(3.86) 
6.37 
(4.50) 
 
 
 
Explaining multilevel network strategies 
  It is clear from the previous analyses that despite the substantial variation between the 
four countries of origin, this variation does not fit the country differences that are reported in a 
large part of the literature (see introduction). Although it is difficult to explain why our 
observations differ from what other authors observe, we can try to explain the observed 
variation within our own sample.
9 One part of our explanatory efforts will concentrate on the 
nature of the policy issues to which the lobby-efforts described in the previous section refer. 
Another important explanation for multilevel venue-shopping concerns the political distance 
of interest organizations vis-à-vis other relevant in their immediate environment. We 
                                                 
8 This composite variable has a somewhat skewed distribution with many actors concentrated at the easy part of 
the scale and few actors at the more difficult side. We also divided this scale in three categories, each consisting 
of about 33% of the sample, whereby each category corresponds to a rank in terms of venues contacted. A cross-
tabulation of this variable with country of origin and organization type yields very similar research outcomes.  
9 One of the factors that might explain the difference between what we and other researchers observe might be 
related to the fact that our research focuses on specific policy issues in which organizations were politically 
involved, namely issues in the area of trade.   20
operationalize this factor by looking at the extent to which group target different types of 
political parties, more in particular whether these parties belong to a governing coalition or 
not. Finally, as our own previous research demonstrated the importance of domestic 
embeddedness, we control for the group’s embeddedness within domestic exchange networks. 
 
  Lobbying political parties  
  For all interest organizations we coded the domestic lobby-networks respondents 
reported in the interviews for each of the issues in which they were involved. Here, we focus 
on the domestic political parties groups exchanged information with. Most empirical research 
shows that groups tend to prioritise contacts with like-minded politicians. There are various 
rationales for this. To begin with, groups lobby like-minded politicians whereby their lobby-
efforts function as some sort of legislative subsidy (Hall and Deardorff 2006). Another reason 
is that interest groups seek access to politicians with opposing policy views (or who are 
undecided) in order to convince them about the group’s viewpoint. If we combine these 
various mechanisms then parties that are part of governing coalitions will always be more 
central and gain most attention from interest groups. Ministers who are part of governing 
coalitions represent member-states in the EU Council. If a group’s positions deviate from the 
views of governing parties, groups may seek to influence these parties. If they agree with 
governing parties interest organizations may seek access these parties in order to support them 
with information and expertise. On average, opposition parties will be less relevant for 
interest groups. Interest groups in agreement with the policies pursued by the governing 
parties do not need additional support from opposition parties and these groups do not seek to 
change the position defended by these parties. Consequently, governing parties gain attention 
from both supporting and opposing interest groups, while opposition parties are more targeted 
by like-minded interest groups. As opposition parties are generally more distant from the 
overall status quo, we can expect substantial differences between groups addressing 
opposition parties and those who ignore opposition parties. The more intense and more 
closely a group exchanges with parties that are far away from the status quo, the more likely it 
is that such groups aim to change the status quo. To put it the other way around, status quo 
oriented groups can limit their lobby-efforts to parties that form governing coalitions while 
opposition groups will tend to build relations with opposition parties.  
  In conceptualizing and coding networks with parties, there are several problems that 
we need to acknowledge. First of all, most governments in Europe are coalition governments, 
sometimes including both centre-right and centre-left parties. Accordingly, such governments   21
provide access-point for multiple, sometimes even opposing interests. Second, for similar 
reasons, governments may invite various, even conflicting, interests to present their point of 
view. Third, party systems are much more complex than a simple distinction between 
governing and opposing parties. For instance on specific issues, opposition parties may agree 
with governing parties. Moreover, opposition parties vary a lot in the sense that some are 
relevant parties for governing coalitions while others are not that relevant (e.g. because they 
are ideologically too extreme in order to be acceptable to other parties). Finally, there are 
large differences between countries in terms of the number of (relevant or non-relevant) 
parties that supply access to interest groups.  
  Table 7 presents some of the key differences between the four countries. We divided 
the data into five mutually exclusive categories. To begin with a substantial number of interest 
groups do not develop contacts with parties (around 30%). Next, we see indeed that majority 
parties gain everywhere most attention, namely 64% of the initiated networks are with 
majority parties compared to 44% for opposition parties. Very few ties are initiated with only 
opposition parties (only 3%); most lobby-efforts with opposition parties are combined with 
lobbying majority parties. Regarding exchanges with opposition parties there are substantial 
differences between the countries, differences that reflect varying domestic circumstances. 
Two countries, France and the Netherlands, changed their governing coalitions during the 
period of our research, which makes that for these countries all mainstream parties were 
coded as being part of a coalition. Both countries differ also strongly from Belgium and 
Germany in terms of the number of parties, and in particular the number of medium-sized 
irrelevant parties. The Netherlands had 9 parties in parliament of which 5 never took part in a 
national governing coalition. For France we counted 11 parties and 7 of these have no 
government experience at the national level. So, the supply of opposition parties in these 
countries consists of a relative large number of peripheral parties situated on both the left and 
the right side of the political spectrum. The situation in Belgium is a bit more complex. On the 
Francophone side there were 4 parties in the national parliament and only one, the 
Francophone Christian Democrats, was in opposition during the period of our research. On 
the Flemish side we had 6 parties and 2 of these, the rightwing populist Vlaams Belang and 
the Christian-Democrats, were during the research period part of the opposition.
10 Germany 
had five parties; two of these were part of the opposition, namely the FDP and the PDS. In 
                                                 
10 The situation in Belgium/Flanders is a bit peculiar in the sense that one opposition party, Vlaams Belang, is 
systematically excluded from coalition talks (the so-called cordon sanitaire). This, of course, affects 
substantially the real number of relevant opposition parties and their potential impact.    22
sum, Belgium and Germany had a much smaller supply of opposition parties and in particular 
peripheral parties. These results are reflected in our data, namely in France and the 
Netherlands all oppositional ties are with peripheral opposition parties, while in Germany and 
Belgium these ties are concentrated with relevant opposition parties.  
 
Table 7. Political exchanges with domestic political parties (column percentages) 
  Organization type  Country of origin  Total n 
   NGOs 
(n=197) 
Business 
(n=264) 
Labor 
(n=106) 
Belgian 
(n=157) 
Dutch 
(n=131) 
German 
(n=134) 
French 
(n=145) 
 
1. no exchanges with 
parties 
30  39  27  39 34 29 33  192  (34%) 
2. only with majority 
parties 
22  20  32  33 17 17 23  131  (23%) 
3. only with opposition 
parties 
3 3 3 -  5  5  1  16  (3%) 
4. with majority and 
relevant opposition 
parties 
13 18  9 24 - 34 -  83  (15%) 
5. with majority and 
peripheral opposition 
parties 
32  19  28  4  44 15 42  145  (26%) 
 
Table 8 presents the average multilevelness of the network strategies for each of the 
separate groups; we excluded the category ‘only exchanges with opposition parties’ because 
of a low n (16). Generally, the data confirm earlier analyses, namely that, irrespective of the 
type of party-contact, French organizations are very active and that labour-unions are not very 
active (compared to NGOs and business-organizations). For other organizations we find 
substantial differences. The first row presents averages for groups that develop no exchanges 
with domestic political parties, i.e. groups that are politically inactive. We observe is that such 
groups are – compared to all other groups – least likely to develop extensive multilevel 
venues. It depends on the country of origin, but on average these groups will address less than 
2.5 (Netherlands) to about 4 (France) venues situated beyond the state level. This finding fits 
the notion of a persistence hypothesis, namely those who are less likely to engage with 
domestic interlocutors are not very active on the international or EU-level (see below).  
The next rows compare different types of interactions with domestic parties. The 
second row summarizes the results for those who maintain exclusive contacts with majority 
parties, i.e. the interest organizations that develop no ties with opposition parties. In all 
countries we find an increase in multi-level venue-shopping when actors move from no party-
contacts to majority; and on average 4.5 to 7.5 venues are addressed. Most interesting is that if 
groups start to include opposition parties into their network, the number of venues grows quite 
substantially towards 7.5 to 8 venues on average. In all countries we see that interactions with   23
opposition parties increase multilevel venue-shopping, but when we differentiate between 
relevant and non-relevant opposition parties we observe that the latter extends the 
multilayered action repertoire of domestic interest groups. A more elaborate multivariate 
analysis of variance demonstrates that this type of connections within the domestic party-
system is very robust; the F-value testing the effect of different types of party-contacts on 
multilevel venue-shopping equals 28.84 (R
2=.16, p<.0001, df=3) and separate analyses within 
each of the four countries confirms the robustness of this relationship.  
 
Table 8. Exchanges with political parties and multilevel venue-shopping (n, averages 
and standard deviations) 
  Organization type  Country of origin   
 
 
groups have 
exchanges with… 
NGOs 
(n=197) 
Business 
(n=264) 
Labor 
(n=106) 
Belgian 
(n=157) 
Dutch 
(n=131) 
German 
(n=134) 
French 
(n=145) 
Overall 
multilevel 
venue-
shopping 
1. no exchanges with 
parties 
3.20  4.08  2.45 3.70 2.66 3.51 4.25  3.56  (3.43) 
2. only with majority 
parties 
3.84  6.87  5.35 4.77 4.45 5.17 7.35  5.39  (4.11) 
4. with majority and 
relevant opposition 
parties 
6.72  7.23  5.20  7.32 - 6.42 -  7.70  (4.40) 
5. with majority and 
peripheral opposition 
parties 
6.72  8.71  5.17 7.50 6.31 7.85 7.56  5.43  (3.74) 
 
 
The nature of the political issues 
When one talks to interest group officials and asks about their political strategies a 
common answer is ‘It depends from issue to issue’. Our project is unique in the sense that we 
attempt to control for issue-specific variation. The responses of the interviewees regarding 
their political strategies concerned one, two or three issues their organizations were involved 
in. Important is how we define and conceptualize an issue (Princen 2007, 24). Issues were 
presented to the respondents as a topic or item on the WTO-policy agenda with regard to 
which actors could have opposing views regarding what needs to be done, the political 
saliency and the distribution of costs and benefits. All issues where framed as a policy 
proposal issued by a political institution and were to be understood as a potential outcome that 
one may oppose or agree with. In total respondents were presented 20 policy issues located in 
three different sectors (agriculture, services and metal/steel) and they could select one, two or 
three issues in which they were involved in one way or another. One half of the issues were 
framed as protectionist and the other half as free trade.  
Here, we analyze how multi-level venue-shopping is affected by a) the sector in which 
issues are situated, b) the salience of the issue for the involved actors, c) the cost-benefit-  24
structure of an issue and d) whether the issue is protectionist in nature or not. The idea behind 
these factors is fairly simple, as the saliency and/or potential cost of one issue increases, the 
efforts to invest in the issue, including the preparedness to develop multi-level venue 
shopping, growths as well. Cost-structure is measured on a -10 <-> +10 scale whereby a 
positive value indicates benefits, while salience is measured on a 10-point scale whereby high 
scores indicate high saliencies. Figure 1 uses recoded and somewhat more convenient scales 
and confronts these with multilevel venue-shopping.  
Figure 1. Average multilevel venue-shopping and issue characteristics
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The findings demonstrate the importance of how issue specific features have a 
substantial and significant impact on multilevel venue-shopping (see figure 1). The relations 
we find between multilevel venue-shopping and issue characteristics are more or less similar 
across countries, which make these findings quite robust. To begin with, if respondents were 
involved in protectionist issues, the propensity to address multilevel access-points (F=18.16, 
df=1, p<.0001) decreases, a finding which fits into the image of protectionism driven by the 
veto-power of national governments.
11 Also the sector has some consequences where we see 
that agriculture attracts more multilevel shopping compared to services and steel/metal 
(F=4.06, df=2, p=.0178). Interesting is the effect of salience and cost-benefit structure, two 
findings that confirm the above mentioned hypothesis. When salience grows, the efforts to 
seek access to more venues almost doubles (F=8.43, df=4, p<.0001), while benefit and, in 
particular, extreme costs, in contrast to a moderate or neutral cost-structure, trigger efforts at 
multilevel venue-shopping (F=5.80, df=4, p<.0001).  
                                                 
11 This finding also confirms an hypothesis put forward by Goldstein and Martin, namely that the growing 
judicialization of WTO trade policies stimulates the mobilization of pro-trade interests, while anti-trade interests 
tend to rely on national political venues (Goldstein and Martin 2000).   25
 
Prominence in domestic policy-networks 
Finally, we examine the effect of domestic institutional embeddedness, measured as 
the extent to which interest groups are themselves addressees of domestic political exchange 
networks. For this measurement we relied on social network analysis whereby the respondents 
indicated exchange relations with all other actors in our survey. The score of each 
organization is simply the number of times this organization was mentioned by other interest 
group officials and the public officials we interviewed. In a previous publication one of us 
demonstrated that domestic embeddedness is positively related to the extent to which groups 
address multiple venues at other levels of government (Beyers 2002). However, this analysis 
of the persistent nature of domestic institutional embeddedness remained confined to the 
Belgian. The current data adds a comparative perspective by inserting three countries to the 
analysis and, instead of making a rough distinction between diffuse and specific interests, we 
rely on three separate categories, namely business, labour and NGOs. Moreover, we insert 
some additional distinctions namely the access groups gain to non-elected bureaucrats and 
elected officials (party officials or politicians).  
 
Table 9. Reliance on domestic exchange networks and multi-level venue-shopping 
(Pearson product moment correlations) 
    Type of interest group  Country of origin 
 Overall  NGOs  Business  Labour  Belgian Dutch German  French 
with other groups and 
public officials 
          
overall access   .19 
p<.0001 
.26 
p=.0002 
.22 
p=.0003 
.26 
p=.0067 
.17 
p=.0292 
.40 
p<.0001 
.10 
p=.2414 
.18 
p=.0266 
with public officials                 
to elected officials  .11 
p=.0076 
.24 
p=.0008 
.12 
p=.0538 
.23 
p=.0155 
.11 
p=.1802 
.36 
p<.0001 
.06 
p=.5084 
.13 
p=.1226 
to ministerial cabinets 
(Belgium, France) 
.21 
p=.0003 
.23 
p=.0153 
.20 
p=.0276 
.24 
p=.0425 
.11 
p=.1890 
- -  .36 
p<.0001 
to ministries  
(Belgium, France) 
.24 
p<.0001 
.25 
p=.0089 
.30 
p=.0007 
.14 
p=.2578 
.19 
p=.0154 
- -  .50 
p<.0001 
to ministries  
(Netherlands, Germany) 
.25 
p<.0001 
.25 
p=.0195 
.29 
p=.0005 
.35 
p=.0333 
- .31 
p=.0003 
.16 
p=.0702 
 
 
 
The correlations in table 9 are fairly easy to interpret. The higher the coefficients, the 
more the involvement within an elaborate domestic exchange network spills over into 
extensive multilevel venue-shopping at the European and international level. Basically, the 
positive correlations confirm some earlier findings, namely that a strong inclusion in domestic 
exchanges energizes the mobilization of multilevel networks. The first and the next three 
columns demonstrate that this is the case when looking at the complete dataset and also when   26
distinguishing between different types, namely NGOs, business and labor.  
When looking at exchanges initiated by public officials it appears that especially a 
reliance on non-elected officials (ministries and ministerial cabinets) corresponds with 
multilevel venue-shopping. Among business a dependence on elected officials has no effect 
and gaining access to ministries (in Belgium and France) has no effect on the multilevel 
activities of labor organizations (which are low anyway). When we compare the dependency-
relations across countries we observe substantial differences. There is no substantial and 
significant relationship in Germany, gaining access or a strong involvement in domestic 
policy-networks bears not relationship with multilevel venue-shopping. The relationship is 
significant, but rather weak, for Belgium where it is primarily access to ministries that shapes 
multilevel venue-shopping. The most outspoken dependency relations exist in France and, 
especially, the Netherlands. In France it is particularly the importance of access to ministries 
and ministerial cabinets, less parties and MPs, that coincides with multi-level venue-shopping. 
In the Netherlands access gained to both elected and non-elected officials has a substantial 
positive relation with the extent of multi-level venue-shopping.   
 
Multivariate regression analyses 
  The final analysis consists of a multivariate analysis whereby we rely on the results of 
a stepwise hierarchical regression-analysis. The independent categorical variables were 
recoded into dummy-variables indicating the absence or presence of a particular condition 
which needs to be contrasted with the reference category. Table 10 presents the results of this 
analysis in which we added step-by-step a set of explanatory variables and whereby we report 
for each step whether the inclusion of additional variables added significantly to the 
explanatory power of the model. Only parameter-estimates significant at the p-value < 0.05 
are reported.  
The change statistics confirm that, controlled for issue-features and party-politics, 
material resources – here measured as the number of FTE employed – bears no effect on the 
propensity to develop multilevel venue-shopping. There is nothing in our dataset that points to 
the importance of resources (model 7). Also when we use other proxies such as investments in 
political advocacy or investments in EU/WTO lobbying we found no significant relationships, 
even when we controlled for this within the different countries of origin.
12 Also a general 
                                                 
12 The aggregate numbers even suggest an opposite relationship. For instance, on average French organizations 
have a higher propensity to conduct multilevel venue-shopping, but at the same time a much lower number of 
French organizations has specialized staff for political advocacy and the number of staff members in a French   27
indication of the policy sector in which interest organizations were active does not add 
significantly to the explanatory power of our model (model 3).  
 
Table 10. Stepwise hierarchical OLS-regression of multilevel venue-shopping 
(parameter estimates and change statistics) 
  Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 
Intercept  3.87 2.93 3.35 3.65 2.93 1.63 1.71 
0 
Party exchanges (dummy-coding)         
No exchange (reference)  - - - - - - - 
Exclusively majority  1.59 1.60 1.61 1.55 1.74 1.53 1.51 
.16 
Majority + relevant opposition  2.25 1.92 1.82 1.65 1.64 1.64 1.70 
.16 
Majority + irrelevant opposition  2.82 2.61 2.56 2.83 3.09 2.80 2.84 
.32 
Issue features         
Protectionist (1-0)    -1.39 -1.58 -1.65 -1.52 -1.43 -1.44 
-.18 
Costs (-2 to +2)    ns ns ns ns ns ns 
Salience (1-5)    .52 .49 .51 .47 .45 .45 
.16 
Sector (dummy-coding)         
Agriculture (reference)  - - - - - - - 
Services      ns ns ns ns ns 
Metal/steel      ns ns  -1.28  ns ns 
Country (dummy-coding)         
Belgium (reference)  - - - - - - - 
Netherlands      -1.65  -1.79  -1.59  -1.60 
-.16 
Germany      ns  ns  ns  ns 
France      ns  ns  ns  ns 
Organization  type    (dummy-coding)        
NGO (reference)  - - - - - - - 
Business       1.49  1.83  1.80 
.22 
Labor       ns  ns  ns 
Networks 
ties with domestic exchange networks 
      . 0 5   . 0 4  
.16 
Resources 
resources: total number of FTE 
       n s  
Model: adjusted R
2 
F-value, df, p-value 
.10 
21.12 
3 
p<.0001 
.16 
19.50 
6 
p<.0001 
.17 
15.20 
8 
p<.0001 
.20 
13.59 
11 
p<.0001 
.24 
13.47 
13 
p<.0001 
.27 
14.65 
14 
p<.0001 
.25 
13.86 
15 
p<.0001 
F-change, p-value  21.12 
3 
p<.0001 
16.17 
3 
p<.0001 
2.08 
2 
p=.1254 
7.80 
3 
p<.0001 
10.32 
2 
p<.0001 
22.98 
1 
p<.0001 
2.35 
1 
p=.1259 
Index: The row with model 7, the full model, has standardized estimated reported in italic.  
 
The most substantial and significant explanatory contribution comes from factors that 
relate to the ties with different types of political parties, issue features, embeddedness in 
domestic exchange networks, organization type and country. Controlled for all other variables, 
                                                                                                                                                         
organization is on average half the number in Belgian, German of Dutch organizations. Moreover, when we look 
at the average personnel we observe that organizations focusing exclusively on governing coalition parties and 
addressing less venues outside their country of origin have on average two to three times more staff members 
(about 144 on average) compared to other organizations (between 40 and 80). Finally, labour-unions are not very 
active multilevel-venue-shoppers, compared to NGOs and business organizations, but the average staff-size of a 
labour-union is about 6 times the staff-size of NGOs and business organizations (265 versus 40 and 46).    28
the distance vis-à-vis different sort of political parties has a significant impact whereby the 
more contacts with peripheral parties, i.e. parties that are further away from the dominant 
status quo, increases the propensity of multilevel venue-shopping. The more issues are 
protectionist and lower the salience, the less one seeks access at the European or international 
level. The bivariate effect of the cost-benefit distribution disappears in the multivariate 
analysis. Our results on the country or origin show that the weak Europeanization of the 
Dutch organizations is something unique to Netherlands as this effect does not disappear 
when controlling for other independent variables. Finally, the importance of exchanges within 
domestic policy networks demonstrates that a persistence effect remains present even when 
our controls for compensation strategies result in positive effects.  
 
 Conclusion 
Generally, we find substantial and significant differences between these four member-
states. Some of our observations contradict earlier work in the field. For instance, on the basis 
case-studies Schmidt concludes that there is a large misfit between the French statist system 
and the EU system (Schmidt 2002). Schmidt claims that one of the main features is the 
exclusion of societal input from policy formulation and that this explains the weak European 
responsiveness of French interest groups. Yet, on the basis of our data, we cannot conclude 
that French groups are weak in terms of building EU-level strategies. On the contrary, it 
appears that French interest groups are much more adapted compared to the Belgian, the 
German and, especially, the Dutch groups. However, much more in-depth research is needed 
in this regard, especially because we lack an explanation for some of the differences between 
the four countries.  
One explanation could be that analysts overestimate and/or under-specify the effect of 
neo-corporatism. In a neo-corporatist setting, access is privileged. But it is not just privileged; 
it is institutionally privileged as it is built on a system of privileged access moderated by 
government agencies. Therefore, organizations do not have to develop skills to force their 
entry, or in case they needed to, needed to possess those skills in a time long foregone. 
Moreover, it is also the government stimulating groups to access, rather than groups just 
finding an open door. This in itself means that organizations with a neo-corporatist 
background are not stimulated to develop the skills to compete with other groups for access. 
This may even have a tranquilizing effect on the ability to compete successfully in a more 
competitive environment, such a in the case of pluralist modes of interest intermediation, or 
even more so in a statist mode of interest intermediation. Groups with a statist background   29
will not only find a government that doesn’t stimulate them explicitly for access, it is even a 
government that is to a certain extent hostile to such access (Wilson 1987). This requires 
groups to almost literally break-in the system. The outcome is then a confrontational mode of 
interest representation in which inside lobbying is combined with conventional outside 
lobbying, and occasionally (even frequently) with disruptive outside lobbying. The 
investment required in the development of relational sources – itself an important tool for 
promoting access (Dahan 2005, 15) – is then, large, and the incentives for groups to invest 
strong. Part of these investments result in the development of generic skills, that is skills that 
are not just relevant at the national level, but readily relevant at the EU level as well. As such, 
groups that are forced to invest heavily in such skills because they are part of a statist system, 
might be much better prepared for the competitive environment in which groups need to act at 
the EU level.  
Second, our empirical analysis shows that instead of one mechanism, two distinct 
mechanisms simultaneously affect multilevel venue-shopping. On the one hand, we have 
indications of persistence, namely that groups with weak contacts with parties or groups that 
are weakly integrated in domestic exchange networks, are less eager to develop multilevel 
venue-shopping. On the other hand, a compensation mechanism is found whereby those who 
are in touch with opposition parties, especially peripheral parties, are more likely to address 
venues at multiple levels of government. One may think that extensive multilevel venue-
shopping is simply the result of organizational capabilities or structural conditions as the 
prevailing domestic mode of interest representation or the sector in which organizations are 
involved, but not much data suggest such an effect. Importantly, however is that the salience 
of the policy issues for groups adds an incentive to invest in multilevel venue-shopping. 
Earlier, we elaborated that trade policies are politically much more sensitive in Belgium and 
France, compared to the Netherlands (Beyers and Kerremans 2007a). In sum, our results 
demonstrate that not resources or the nature of the domestic system shapes the propensity of 
multilevel venue-shopping, but that much has to do with the salient nature of European 
policies and how organizations are positioned in a political space. 
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